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"SHOOTING AN ELEPHANT"'

-

MASSACHUSETTS

MAINTAINS REASONABLE SUSPICION:
PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY DURING
TRAFFIC STOPS AND BATTLING RACIAL
PROFILING
"...[T]o eliminate any requirement that the officer be able to explain that reasonsfor his actions signals an abandonment of effective judicial supervision..,leaves police discretion utterly without limits. Some citizens will be subjected to this minor indignity while others -- perhaps those
with more expensive cars, or different bumper stickers, or differentcolored skin - may escape it entirely." 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost every American has encountered the police while driving
on the American roadways. The pervasiveness of automobile ownership
in our culture increases the potential for police-citizen contact.4 However,
the United States Supreme Court views the citizen's expectation of privacy
in automobiles as significantly lower than in homes because of a car's inherent mobility, its exposure to public view, and the fact that its use is extensively regulated. 5 In a case not directly relating to automobiles, the
1 Title of a George Orwell essay, describing his service as an officer in British controlled Burma. Orwell's first hand account of his encounter with a "must" elephant symbolizes official power and discretionary authority. GEORGE ORWELL, SHOOTING AN
ELEPHANT AND OTHER EsSAYS
2 Pennsylvania

(1978).

v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 122 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).

3 See

David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the
FourthAmendment, 1997 SuP. CT. REv. 271,308.
4 See David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment's Death on the Highway,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556 (1998).
5 See, e.g.,. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985) (discussing mobility rationale); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (upholding warrantless search of
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6
Court transformed Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in Terry v. Ohio,
when it permitted for the first time a search and seizure without probable
cause. 7 This transformation marked the beginning of a federal trend to
shift the balance of interests under the Fourth Amendment from individual
liberty to increased law enforcement and public safety.8

As our Fourth Amendment rights continue to diminish, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ( "SJC") has utilized an alternative source
of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 9 This alternative
protection has signaled important progress in the battle against racial profiling. ' 0 Article Fourteen of the Massachusetts Constitution ("Article 14"),
the model from which the founding fathers drafted the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, provides Massachusetts citizens with an
alternative basis to support unreasonable search and seizure claims."
motor home). See generally Craig M. Bradley, The Court's "Two Model" Approach to the
Fourth Amendment: Carpe Diem!, 84 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1993) (discussing
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with regard to automobiles).
6 See 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Recognizing need for warrantless searches and seizures).
7See id. (permitting brief stops and frisks without probable cause).
8 See David A. Harris, Factorsfor Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor
Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 660 (1994) (discussing Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence affect on minorities).

9See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
10See Id. See also Harris, supra note 4, at 556; Sklansky, supra note 3, at 308.
" See

MASS.

CONST. Pt. 1, art. XIV (1780). Article Fourteen provides:

Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and
seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All
Warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of
them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order
in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspect places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search,
arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with
the formalities prescribed by the laws.
Id. See also Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 668, 711 N.E.2d 108, 115
(1999) (commenting on use of Article Fourteen in drafting Fourth Amendment); Tracey
Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A HistoricalReview, 77 B.U. L. REV.
925 (1997) (providing detailed history of Fourth Amendment arguments).
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Given the continued weakening of Fourth Amendment rights through federal jurisprudence, Article 14 is an important source for protecting citizens
against racial profiling, police practice of targeting suspects based on
race. 12
This note focuses narrowly on an officer's authority to order occupants out of lawfully detained automobiles, Massachusetts' response to the
federal constitutional requirements regarding searches and seizures, and
the impact this response has on the pervasive and disturbing practice of
racial profiling. Part I of this note examines the Supreme Court decisions
in Pennsylvania v. Mimms 13 and Maryland v. Wilson14; emphasizing their
application of search and seizure law to police exit orders during routine
traffic stops.' 5 Section II discusses Massachusetts' response to the Supreme Court decisions, in the above-mentioned cases, to weaken search
and seizure protections under the Fourth Amendment. 16 Section III compares Article 14 of the Massachusetts Constitution to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 17 Section IV analyzes the importance of search and seizure jurisprudence in protecting against racial profiling.' 8 Finally, this note concludes by suggesting that Massachusetts provide a national example in the battle against racial profiling by continuing
its efforts to preserve strong protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND EXIT ORDERS
The Supreme Court cases Pennsylvania v. Mimms19 and Maryland
v. Wilson20 have been integral to the Court's application of Fourth
12See Harris, Supra note 4, at 556; Sklansky, supra note 3 at 308; Abraham
Abramovsky and Jonathan I. Edelstein, Pretext Stops and Racial Profiling After Whren v.
United States: The New York and New Jersey Responses Compared, 63 Alb. L. Rev. 725,
730(2000).
13 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (applying Fourth Amendment law to police traffic stops).
14519 U.S. 408 (1997) (applying Fourth Amendment protections to passengers during traffic stops).
IsSee infra notes 19-47 and accompanying text.
16See infra notes 48-87 and accompanying text.
17See infra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
18See infra notes 104-123 and accompanying text.
19434 U.S. 106 (1977) (applying Fourth Amendment law to police traffic stops).
20 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (applying Fourth Amendment protections to passengers dur-

ing traffic stops)

JOURNAL OF TRIAL &APPELLATE ADVOCACY

(Vol. VI

Amendment law to traffic stops. 2' In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 22 a divided
Supreme Court held that under the Fourth Amendment an officer may order a driver out of a lawfully detained vehicle without articulable reasonable suspicions.23 Twenty years later, in Maryland v. Wilson,24 the Court
extended the Mimms holding to include passengers.25
A. Pennsylvania v. Mimms
Two Philadelphia police officers stopped Harry Mimms
("Mimms") for driving his vehicle with an expired license plate. 2 6 One of
the officers ordered Mimms out of his automobile and to produce his
owner's card and driver's license.2 7 As Mimms complied, the officer noticed a bulge under Mimms' jacket.28 The officer then frisked Mimms out
of fear that the bulge might have been a weapon. 29 The frisk uncovered a
loaded revolver, and Mimms was subsequently arrested and indicted on
weapons charges.30 The lower court denied Mimms' request to suppress
the revolver as evidence discovered pursuant3 to an unlawful search and
seizure, and the jury ultimately convicted him. '
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed Mimms' conviction,
holding that the seizure of the revolver was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.32 On appeal from that decision, the United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding the officer's exit order reasonable and permissible
under the Fourth Amendment, despite the lack of reasonable suspicion in
21

U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing Constitutional protection from unreasonable

searches and seizures); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (providing Fourth
Amendment protection to passengers during routine traffic stops); Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106 (1977) (applying Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to ordinary traffic stops).
22 Cf Mimms, 434 U.S. at 106 (holding exit order lawful)
23 Cf Mimins, 434 U.S. at 109-113 (allowing arbitrary exit orders during lawful traffic stops).
24 Wilson, 519 U.S. at 408.
2
26

Id at 410.
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 107.

27 Id.

28

id.

29 Id

3 Id.
31Mimms, 434 U.S. at 112 (holding police exit order reasonable).
32 See Pennsylvania v Mimms, 471 Pa. 546, 552, 370 A.2d 1157, 1160
(1977) (finding officer's exit order lacked reasonable articulable suspicions of threat).
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the circumstances. 33 Thus, the Court departed from its longstanding requirement of "reasonable suspicion" for searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment, reasoning that additional restrictions on personal
freedom of movement during lawful traffic detentions were a minor inconvenience when weighed against threats to officer safety. 34
B. Maryland v. Wilson
Whereas Mimms involved additional intrusions into a driver's freedom of movement, Wilson focused on additional intrusions into a passenger's freedom of movement. 35 Jerry Lee Wilson ("Wilson") rode in the
front passenger seat of a rental car that Officer Hughes pulled over for
traveling sixty-four miles per hour in a fifty-five mile an hour zone. 36 Officer Hughes, after noticing Wilson "sweating" and appearing "extremely
nervous", ordered him out of the car. 37 As Wilson exited the car, crack
cocaine fell to the ground. 38 Wilson was arrested and indicted on drug
charges. 39 At the preliminary hearing, Wilson moved to suppress the cocaine, arguing that Officer Hughes' exit order constituted an unreasonable
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 4° The Baltimore County Circuit
Court granted Wilson's motion and the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland affirmed. 4' After the Maryland Court of Appeals denied review,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 42 In a 7-2 decision, the Court reversed and extended the principle set forth in Mimms to passengers of law-

33 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111, n.6 (countering dissent's suggestion that
Per Curiam opinion allows officer's at will order of drivers from vehicles).
34 See id at 112; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (allowing "pat frisks"
for officer safety where reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists); Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (requiring specific, objective facts for lawful seizure under Fourth
Amendment).
35 See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (allowing officer's authority to demand passengers out of lawfully stopped vehicles).
36 Id. at 410.
371d at 410-11.
38 id

39id

40 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,411 (1997).
41

id; see also Maryland v. Wilson, 106 Md. App. 24, 664 A.2d I (1995) (declining

to extend Mimms rule to passengers).
42 Maryland v. Wilson, 340 Md. 502, 667 A.2d 342 (1995); see also Maryland v.
Wilson, 518 U.S. 1003 (1996) (denying certiorari).
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fully stopped vehicles.43 The Court again found that officer safety outweighed a passenger's liberty interests. 44 The Court suggested that a presumption of serious crime and a motivation to employ violence to prevent
apprehension justifies this "minimal change in circumstance" to avert a
passenger's possible access to weapons. 45 Coupled with the Court's decision in Mimms, the Court's holding in Wilson provides police officers with
unfettered control over the freedom of movement of all occupants of lawfully detained vehicles enjoy until the officer deems appropriate. 46 Justice
Kennedy noted that with the Wilson decision "the Court puts tens of millions of passengers at risk of arbitrary control by the police."47
III. THE MASSACHUSETTS RESPONSE
Established case law dictates that a traffic stop ends once the driver
has produced a valid license and registration, unless the police have sufficient grounds to suspect current or prior criminal activity.48 Massachusetts
courts have cited Mimms with approval but they have required some objective grounds for the exit orders during routine traffic stops. 49 In Com-

43 Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415 (reasoning passengers pose greater danger to officers

during routine traffic stops).
44See id at 413-14 (acknowledging stronger sense of personal liberty for passengers
than drivers).
45See id. at 414-15 (characterizing police traffic stops as conduits to uncover other
"serious crimes").
46See id. at 415; see also Mimms, 434 U.S. at Ill (announcing officer's automatic
entitlement to give exit orders).
47 Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 890 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (commenting on affect
of recent Court decision).
48 See Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 158, 674 N.E.2d 638, 642 (1997)

(holding no reasonable suspicion existed after completion of valid stop to justify continued
seizure); see also Commonwealth v. Loughlin, 385 Mass. 60, 430 N.E.2d 823 (1982);
Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 376 Mass. 502, 381 N.E.2d 141, 142 (1978); Commonwealth v.
Alvarez, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 692 N.E. 2d 106 (1998); Commonwealth v. Ellsworth, 41
Mass. App. Ct. 554, 671 N.E.2d 1001 (1996).
49 See Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 212-13, 649 N.E.2d 717, 722
(1995) (stating officer exit order reasonable for safety of public or officer); Commonwealth
v. Moses, 408 Mass. 136, 557 N.E.2d 14 (1990) (holding officer's actions reasonable precaution for own safety); Commonwealth v. Robbins, 407 Mass. 147, 552 N.E.2d 77 (1990)
(allowing officer's exit order where officer noticed possible weapon); Commonwealth v.
Ferrara, 376 Mass. 502, 381 N.E.2d 141 (1978) (permitting precautionary steps for officer
safety); Commonwealth v. Lantigua, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 526, 649 N.E.2d 1129 (1995)
(stating vehicle occupant's concealed movements justifies exit order).
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monwealth v. Santana,50 the SJC restated the Mimms holding that Massachusetts police may give exit orders to occupants of lawfully stopped vehicles." However, the SJC required an objective standard for determining
whether the perceived threat to an officer or public safety justifies an exit
5 3 the SJC ruled that after verificaorder.52 In Commonwealth v. Ferrara,
tion of the license and registration, no reasonable suspicion existed to justify an exit order or further interrogation. 54
The SJC further demonstrated its unwillingness to follow the Supreme Court's lead in diminishing protection from unreasonable searches
and seizures in Commonwealth v. Gonsalves,55 where Justice Greaney explicitly declined to adopt either Mimms or Wilson.56 In Gonsalves, a Massachusetts State Trooper ("Trooper") immediately ordered Mr. Gonsalves
out of the back seat of a lawfully stopped taxicab.5 7 The Trooper interrogated Mr. Gonsalves, searched the back seat of the taxicab, and seized a
bag of cocaine. 58 The Superior Court granted Mr. Gonsalves' motion to
suppress both the cocaine and his statements due to the Trooper's failure to
provide an objective basis for his exit order.59 Relying on Article 14, the
Appeals Court affirmed the suppression order and rejected the Commonwealth's request that the SJC follow the Mimms and Wilson progeny. 6°
Justice Greaney acknowledged the SJC's practice of granting greater protections to occupants of vehicles under Article 14 than are recognized under the Fourth Amendment. 6' In his majority opinion, Justice Greaney
acknowledged that "[t]he nature of federalism requires that State Supreme
50

Santana, 420 Mass. at 212-13, 649 N.E.2d at 722.

51Id (explaining officer's right to order occupants from vehicle so long as objective

suspicions exist to determine justification of exit orders).
52 Id.
53376 Mass. at 505, 381 N.E.2d at 144.
54Id. (accepting Mimms principle but further requiring articulable reasonable suspicion for exit order).
55See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 711 N.E.2d 108 (1999).
56 Id. at 663, 711 N.E.2d at 112 (acknowledging state constitution's power to circumvent Fourth Amendment argument).
57Id at 659, 711 N.E.2d at 109.
58

hia
58Id

6 See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 186, 704 N.E.2d 515 (1999);
see generally MA. CONST. pt. 1, art. 14 (providing Constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures).
61See Gonsalves, 429 Mass. at 662, 711 N.E.2d at 111 (affirming court's departure
from Supreme Court's view of search and seizure protections).
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Courts and State Constitutions be strong and independent repositories of
In Gonsalves,
authority in order to protect the rights of their citizens.
the SJC outlined an objective test for determining a justifiable exit order
as, "whether a reasonably prudent man in the policeman's position would
be warranted in the belief that the safety of the police or that of other persons was in danger. '63 The SJC concluded that Article 14 protects Massachusetts motorists by requiring police officers to articulate a reasonable
suspicion of danger to safety in order to justify an exit order. 64 This requirement emphasizes the Massachusetts position that an intrusion into an
automobile occupant's privacy is significant, and therefore requires judicial protection.65 The SJC supports a passenger's reasonable expectation
of a higher sense of privacy than a driver's. 66 The SJC contemplated the
inherent dangers police officers face during routine traffic stops, but
stressed the need for specific, articulable facts indicating that danger exists
to prevent random, disparate treatment of motorists.6 7
The reasonable suspicion standard does not create a high threshold
of factual information. 68 The SJC acknowledged that the objective test is
based on professional experience, not just ordinary reasonableness. 69
Furthermore, reasonable suspicion must relate to an officer's heightened
awareness of danger to safety, not just potential criminal activity. 70
The SJC found reasonable suspicion to exist in Commonwealth v.
62

Id. at 668, 711 N.E. 2d at 115 (explaining ability of states to provide greater pri-

vacy protection).
63 Id. at 661, 711 N.E.2d at 110, (quoting Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205,
212-13, 649 N.E.2d 717, 722 (1995) quoting Commonwealth v. Almeida, 373 Mass 266,
271, 366 N.E.2d 756 (1977)).
64 Id. at 662-3, 711 N.E.2d at 111-12 (repeating Article Fourteen principles expressed in Massachusetts case law). But Cf. Loughlin, 385 Mass. at 62. (stating proper exit
orders exist without reasonable suspicion when occur before justified threshold inquiry).
65See Gonsalves, 429 Mass. at 663, 711 N.E.2d at 112 (balancing private interests of
personal autonomy with safety needs of police and public).
66See id.
at 663, 711 N.E.2d at 112-13; Torres, 424 Mass. at 157, 674 N.E.2d at 641
(reasoning passengers harbor more privacy concerns because of lack of participation in
motor vehicle operation).
67 See Gonsalves, 429 Mass. at 663-664, 711 N.E.2d at 112-13 (addressing social

concerns of police abuse based on race, gender, and age).
68See Gonsalves, 429 Mass. at 664, 711 N.E.2d at 113 (declaring need for more than
a hunch).
69 See id.
at 661, 711 N.E.2d at 110 (stating justified exit order exists if"reasonably
prudent man in policeman's position" would believe threat of safety).
70

See id.at 662-663, 711 N.E.2d at 112-13 (concluding Article Fourteen requires

reasonable belief of danger to officer or public safety).
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Almeida'7 1 where a driver, driving late at night in a known high crime area,
failed to supply an officer with the vehicle registration, and cautiously
opened the glove compartment only enough to retrieve his wallet. 72 Likewise, the court found reasonable suspicion for an exit order existed in
Commonwealth v. Johnson73 when, after a high-speed chase, the officer
noticed the driver place something in his pants. 74 The SJC also found reasonable suspicion where a passenger reached between the seats after the
driver tried to evade police. 75
Although applying federal constitutional law, the court in United
States v. Woodrum76 explained the necessary requirements for reasonable
suspicion.77 In Woodrum, the defendant slouched in the back seat, kept his
hand moving inside his jacket, and then placed his other hand inside his
jacket.7 8 After the appellant refused the officer's request to remove his
hands, the officers ordered him out of the vehicle. 79 The court found these
objective articulations sufficient to raise reasonable suspicion for a legitimate exit order despite recognizing that Mimms permits officers to order
passengers out of a vehicle absent reasonable suspicion.8 °
Massachusetts courts concur that an officer's "hunch" fails to adequately satisfy the reasonable suspicion threshold.8' In Commonwealth v.
Torres,82 the court found detentions based upon "hunches" arbitrary and
inconsistent with Article 14.83 Although the passenger in Torres exited the
71Commonwealth v. Almeida, 373 Mass. 266, 366 N.E.2d 756 (1977).
72

Idat 271-72, 366 N.E.2d at 760.

73 413 Mass. 598, 600, 602 N.E.2d 555, 556 (1992).
74

Id

75 Commonwealth v. Vanderlinde, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 311, 314-15, 534 N.E.2d 811

(1989).
76

202 F. 3d 1 (2000) (holding taxi driver's consent legitimized the stop).

77 Id at 6-8 (finding reasonable suspicion to justify exit order).
78

Id at 13 (noting objective facts required to show reasonable suspicion).

79 Id (stating justification for officer's exit order).

80 Id. (finding objective reasonable suspicion for officer's exit order).
81 See Gonsalves, 429 Mass. at 664, 711 N.E.2d at 112-113 (announcing minimum
requirement for objective reasonable suspicion to justify exit orders); see also Commonwealth v. Kimball, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 604, 605, 641 N.E.2d 1066 (1994) (holding no reasonable suspicion existed to justify further interrogation or vehicle protective search). The
court found that the officer stopped the defendant's vehicle because of a hunch that the
"disreputable looking jalopy" was stolen. Id. at 604, 641 N.E.2d at 1066.
82 424 Mass. at 159 (finding lack of objective reasonable suspicion).
83 Torres, 424 Mass. at 160, 674 N.E.2d at 644 (explaining failure of multitude of
non-offenses to reach reasonable suspicion threshold); see also Commonwealth v. Silva,
366 Mass. 403, 406, 318 N.E.2d 895, 898 (1974) (applying objective test to officer's rea-

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. VI

vehicle on his own accord, the SJC found his subsequent detention unlawful because exiting the vehicle and a slight delay in responding to the officer did not amount to reasonable suspicion.84 Accordingly, these cases
reinforce the present rule that an officer must justify his exit order with
articulable reasonable suspicions that danger to the officer's safety
exists. 85 Once the suspicion of danger subsides, any justification for further detention disappears. 86 If no justification exists for further detention,
the motorists should be permitted to leave. 87
IV. HISTORICAL COMPARISON OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
AND ARTICLE FOURTEEN
The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, enacted seven years before the enactment of the Federal Constitution, was first in providing protections for citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.88 The British general writs of assistance, which permitted the Crown's officers to
search and seize at their absolute and unlimited discretion, provoked an
anti-British response in Massachusetts.8 9 James Otis argued before the
sonable belief of endangered safety).
84 Id. Torres, passenger in a lawfully stopped vehicle, delayed in responding to the
officer after the officer knocked on the passenger window. Id. at 155, 674 N.E.2d at 640.
His response was to exit the vehicle, suddenly. Id. The SJC found reasonable suspicion to
have Torres stand behind the vehicle while the officer further inquired the driver. id. at 157,
674 N.E.2d at 641. The SJC held that once the officer decided to interrogate Torres, a
seizure occurred and no reasonable suspicion of potential officer danger existed to justify
the continued detention. Id at 159, 674 N.E.2d at 642.
85 See Woodrum, 202 F.3d at 5; Gonsalves, 429 Mass. at 664, 711 N.E.2d at 112-

113; Torres, 424 Mass. at 160, 674 N.E.2d at 644; Almeida, 373 Mass. at 272, 366 N.E.2d
756; Johnson, 413 Mass at 600, 602 N.E.2d at 555.
86 See Gonsalves, 429 Mass. at 664, 711 N.E.2d at 113; Torres, 424 Mass. at 160,
674 N.E.2d at 644; Ferrara,376 Mass at 505, 381 N.E.2d at 141; Kimball, 37 Mass. App.
Ct. at 607, 641 N.E.2d at 1066.
87 See Gonsalves, 429 Mass. at 663, 711 N.E.2d at 112; Torres, 424
Mass. at 157,
674 N.E.2d at 644; Kimball, 37 Mass. App. Ct. at 607, 641 N.E.2d 1066. But see Berkermer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (explaining few motorists willing to defy officer
orders without permission).
88 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; MA CONST. pt. 1, art. 14; Gonzalves, 429 Mass. at
667-68, 711 N.E.2d at 114-15; Commonwealth v. Cundriff, 382 Mass. 137, 144, 415

N.E.2d 172, 176.
89

See Cundriff,382 Mass. at 143 (examining the evolution of Article Fourteen of the

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights); see also

NELSON

B.

LASSON, THE HISTORY AND

DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

(1970).

54,
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Superior Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony against the issuances of
general writs of assistance in 1761.90 Otis' argument, where he is said to
have condemned the writs as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power...a
power that places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer," is generally considered the earliest opposition to the Crown. 9 1 Article 14 was later enacted in large part92to protect Massachusetts' citizens
from abuse of these writs of assistance.
In rejecting the Commonwealth's argument in Gonsalves, that the
SJC must follow the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment, Justice Greaney explained that Article 14 provided a model
for the drafters of the Fourth Amendment.9 3 Although Massachusetts
maintained Article 14, the Fourth Amendment's protections extended to
the states in 1949, through the Fourteenth Amendment. 94 Thus, until recently, state courts primarily relied upon Federal Constitutional interpretations when deliberating privacy matters.95
Chief Justice Herbert P. Wilkins of the SJC noted that "the [United
States] Supreme Court describ[ed] a common base from which [states] can
90

See L.

ROTH

&

HILLER ZOBEL,

2

LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS

106, 140-42

(1965).
91See id. at 140-42.

92See Gonsalves, 429 Mass. at 669, 711 N.E.2d at 116 (IrelandJ., concurring)(declaring Supreme Judicial Court's authority under state constitution); Cundriff, 382 Mass. at
144, 415 N.E.2d at 176 (discussing development of search and seizure law); see also M.H.
SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 1 (1978) (analyzing Writs of assistance case heard

in SJC and detailing surrounding history).
93See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 161 (1947) (Frankfurter,J.,
dissenting);
Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 372, 476 N.E.2d 548, 555 (1985); Gonsalves,
429 Mass. at 668, 711 N.E.2d at 115; JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE

SUPREME COURT 38 (1966); Remarks of Chief Justice Herbert P. Wilkins to Students at
New England School of Law on March 27, 1997, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1205, 1213 (Summer 1997). But see LASSON, supra note 89, at 79-82 (suggesting Fourth Amendment influence from seven different states' bill of rights); Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment,
Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 53-54 (1996) (minimizing
historical claims of Article Fourteen influence on drafters of the Fourth Amendment).
94See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (extending prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures to states via Fourteenth Amendment); see also William J.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protectionof IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. REV.
489, 493 (1977) (recalling Supreme Court cases extending Federal Bill of Rights provisions
to states).
95See Wilkins, supra note 93, at 1212 (asserting state courts previously minimal interest in state constitution); Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and State
Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 166 (1984) (discussing state courts return to state constitution
for source of authority); see Brennan supra note 94, at 489 (discussing rise in state court
reliance on state constitution).
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go up." 96 In other words, the provisions of state constitutions guaranteeing
liberties must therefore not provide fewer protections than those provided
by the Federal Constitution. 97 A state court's authority to enforce rights
guaranteed by the state constitution requires the justices to interpret the
provisions according to their views. 98 State court reliance upon state constitutions in protecting civil liberties does not invalidate the Supreme
Court's interpretation of corresponding Federal Constitutional rights. 99 In
fact, state courts should faithfully deliberate federal court constitutional
decisions and, if opposed, raise state law as an alternative source of protection.1 °0 The present concern is not whether to use state constitutions but
how to use them.' 0' A state's focus on state constitutional provisions may
be the result of concerns about the Supreme Court's continuing support for
broad police power.10 2 As one commentator alleges, "the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as tattered and full of holes as a beggar's winter coat, calls into question whether the remaining protection it
offers to03 citizens against government searches and seizures has any
value." 1

9 See Wilkins, supra note 93, at 1213 (discussing changes in legal profession and
substantive law).
97 See Brennan, supra note 94, at 491 (observing increase use of state constitutional
provisions by state courts as source of additional protection); Wilkins, supra note 93, at
1213 (indicating Federal Constitution only affords minimal protection); see also Gonsalves,
429 Mass. at 668, 711 N.E.2d at 115 (offering state constitution as source for greater protection).
98 See Gonsalves, 429 Mass. at 668, 711 Mass. N.E.2d at 115 (explaining need for
justices to interpret state constitution not solely in-line with United States Supreme Court);
see Brennan supra note 94, at 491 (emphasizing importance of state courts use of state
constitutions as source of individual liberties).
99 See Wilkins, supra note 93, at 1213 (Summer 1997) (explaining states reliance on
state law not contrary to Supreme Court); Brennan, supra note 94, at 501-02 (enhancing
notion that Supreme Court decisions not dispositive of individual rights).
100 See Brennan, supra note 94, at 491; see also Wilkins, supra note 93, at 1213.
101See Linde, supra note 95, at 166 (discussing state courts returning to state constitutions to resolve liberty issues).
102See Harris, supra note 4, at 556 (criticizing the Supreme Courts failure to protect
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures); Brennan, supra note 94, at 495 (considering reasons for states reemphasis on state constitutions).
103See Harris, supra note 4, at 556 (asserting no protection available to motorist in
Fourth Amendment).
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V. DRIVING UNDER THE LAW
As Fourth Amendment protections diminish, an officer's abuse of
his discretional authority evokes real and enduring concerns for motorists
and, indeed, all citizens.'°4 In fact, Justice Brennan, concerned with the
path of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, described its balancing of interests as done with "the judicial thumb.. .planted firmly on the
law enforcement side of the scales."' 10 5 Traffic stops based upon race occur frequently and arbitrarily."°6 Racial profiling occurs when police use
race as a negative indicator that triggers an officer's suspicion. 0 7 The
general public disapproves of racial profiling and further, they believe it is
widespread. 0 8 An ACLU report found that blacks drove seventy-three
percent of cars stopped and searched on Maryland's Interstate 95, despite
the fact that blacks only comprise fourteen percent of those driving in that
area.' °9 Police found no illegal contraband in seventy percent of those
vehicles searched."10 Similarly, on a stretch of Interstate 95 in Florida,
blacks make up less than ten percent of drivers but seventy percent of persons stopped and searched."'
The pervasiveness of automobile ownership in American culture
increases the potential for police-citizen contact. 1 2 Increased contact re3 The motorist becomes the
sults in de facto decreased personal privacy. 11
target of unfettered police authority, despite the legitimate governmental
104See Traffic Stops, 11 HARv. L. REV. 299, 306 (1997) (discussing Supreme

Court's ruling in Mimms and Wilson).
105
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 720 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" And All Other Traffic Offenses: The
Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 555
(1997) (discussing pervasiveness of racial based traffic stops); David A. Harris, Driving
While Black: Racial Profiling On Our Nations Highways, American Civil Liberties Union
Freedom Network (June 1999), http://www.aclu.org/profiling/report/index.htm; see also,
'Profiling' Rates a Look in LA., Los ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 25, 2000, at B6; John A.
Dvorak, Data on Traffic Stops Sought Racial Profiling Cited by Lawmaker, THE KANSAS
CITY STAR, Jan. 20, 2000, at Al; Jerry Oliver, Police Target Most Likely Criminals of All
Races, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 2000, at G3.
307 H.R. Rep. No. 517 (2000).
106

108[d

Report of John Lamberth, PhD., ACLU Freedom Network, www.aclu.org
109
I0
Id.
11 See Harris, supra note 106, at 561-63.
112 See Harris, supra note 4 at 576-579.
113 See id.
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interest in a traffic stop ending with the completion of a citation. 14 The
state's safety interests extend to unnecessary or improper police encounters with citizens.115
Many automobile stops are executed for reasons beyond simple
traffic law enforcement. 116 In fact, police acknowledge the potential revelation of a more serious crime in every stop." 7 However, in those circumstances where vehicles are stopped under the pretext of a traffic violation,
the traffic stop objective changes from routine traffic violation enforcement to drug and violent crime investigations. 18 In an attempt to cure
these pretextual stops, the petitioners in Whren v. United States 19 unsuccessfully sought to have the Court adopt a Fourth Amendment test of
whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would
have made the stop for
20
the reasons given in the particular cirsumstance. 1
The reasonable suspicion requirement demands that officers provide objective articulable reasons for exit orders.' 2' "Insisting that police
officers explain their decision to single out a particular passenger for
questioning would help prevent their reliance on impermissible criteria
such as race." 22 However, when the Supreme Court granted officers nonreviewable authority to order drivers and passengers from their vehicles,
the Court removed another protective procedure in the war against racial
23
profiling.
V. CONCLUSION
While cities across the country conduct studies and state legisla114

See id.; Traffic Stops, supra note 104, at 302 (explaining extent of police author-

ity during routine traffic stops).
115 See Traffic Stops, supra note 104, at 302.
116See Harris, supra note 4, at 567; Traffic Stops, supra note 104, at 302.
117

See id.

118

See id.

"19 517 U.S. 806 (1996)
120

Id. at 809 (holding subjective intent of officers actions inapplicable to traffic

stops).
121 See Gonsalves, 429 Mass. at 661, 711 N.E.2d at 110 (stating justified exit order
exists if "reasonably prudent man in policeman's position" would believe threat of safety).
122

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 450 n.4 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (de-

scribing race-based selection of passengers for questioning in bus sweeps)
123 See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 333-34; Wilson, 519 U.S. at 410; Harris, supra note 4, at
582-83; Traffic Stops, supra note 104, at 302.
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tures propose bills regarding the use of racial profiling, Massachusetts'
courts have maintained a search and seizure procedure that provides a
small but effective safeguard against biased and arbitrary police power.
The pervasive use of the automobile in American culture results in a figurative collision course between a majority of the citizens and the police.
The Supreme Court has continued its trend toward greater police discretion
and less privacy protection for motorists. Massachusetts, however, continues to lead a growing number of states that are unwilling to follow the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, and are therefore using their own constitutional provisions as an alternate source of
protection for motorists. The ultimate benefit of this non-reviewable path
is not just broader protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, but
also protection from race based crime prevention tactics. The SJC should
be commended for its leadership in search and seizure jurisprudence and
the protection of citizens' personal autonomy. Massachusetts should be
regarded as a model for other states because of its efforts to utilize the state
constitution to provide citizens with greater privacy protection in their
vehicle.
Colin M. Black

